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The story of Paesi is known to Indologists from Ernst Leumann's long contribution in 1885 
— called “Beziehungen der Jaina-Literatur zu andern Literaturkreisen Indiens” — to the 
Actes du sixième congrès international des orientalistes (Leide: E. J. Brill, pp. 469-564; 
reprint in Kleine Schriften, ed. Nalini Balbir, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1998, pp. 29-124). 
We learn from it that the story of Paesi in Jaina literature corresponds to the story of Påyåsi 
which occurs in the Buddhist D¥gha Nikåya (DN II. 316 ff.). Leumann briefly presented the 
two stories in his article, followed by a discussion in which he pointed out that the story of 
Paesi/Påyåsi is the only long legend which Buddhist and Jaina literature have in common, 
and that it is one of the rare examples of a lively dialogue that has reached a degree of 
sophistication which distinguishes it from the simple dialogues of earlier days.1 
 Bollée justifies his book with the following words (p. VII): “[Leumann] had to use 
this text in MS form, but it was printed still in the 19th century whereas a romanized edition 
of the Råyapaseˆ¥yasutta is not yet available. To fill at least half this gap, such a version of 
the story of Paesi, the second part of the 2nd Uvanga, may be a small contribution to this 
revival of interest in the great Swiss scholar's pioneer work.” Bollée's book presents the text 
of the story (drawn from various editions of the Råyapaseˆiya), along with an English 
translation and detailed notes. The notes draw upon Malayagiri's commentary, parallel 
passages in other texts, and on the secondary literature. The main work is followed by a 
detailed “Glossary of Selected Words” (pp. 223-305), an Index rerum (pp. 307-316), 
Quotations (p. 317), a Bibliography (pp. 319-355), while an Appendix contains the text and 
                                                
1 Leumann, op. cit. p. 527 (87): “Sie [i.e. diese Paesi-Påyåsi-Sage] ist nicht nur, soweit mand bis jetzt sehen 
kann, die einzige der buddhistischen und jinistischen Literatur gemeinsame grössere Sage, sondern ist auch 
eines der seltenen Musterstücke eines lebendig geführten Dialogs, in seiner vorliegenden Gestalt nicht einer 
aus der ältesten Zeit des Buddhismus oder Jinismus, wo die Dialoge noch ... in ursprünglicher Einfachkeit und 
ohne künstliche Concinnität reproducirt wurden, sondern ein Dialog, wie er sich in der Tradition auf Indien's 
hiefür geeignetem Boden zu einem künstlich-typischen herausgebildet hat.” Cp. Bollée p. 1: “the legend of 
Paesi / Påyåsi ... is probably the only larger legend common to Buddhist and Jaina literature [and] is one of the 
rare samples of a lively dialogue.” 
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translation of a portion of Haribhadra's Samarâicca-kahå, in which the nåstika Pingakesa is 
involved in a discussion with a Jaina teacher (pp. 357-368). 
 The introduction and the notes contain some interesting suggestions and 
observations that are not further elaborated. The introduction, for example, raises the 
following question: “The experimental search for the soul seems to be expected rather from 
a Greek than from an Indian. Could, therefore, a foreign name be hidden behind the deß¥ 
words Paesi and Påyåsi of whom a common etymology seems difficult?” Bollée could in 
this connection have drawn attention to his own conclusion on p. 138 to the extent that in 
Paesi's state the social order was apparently not that of brahminical Hinduism: the four 
classes here (pp. 136-137) enumerated are the k∑atriya class (khattiya-pariså), the 
householders' class (gåhåvai-pariså), the brahmin class (måhaˆa-pariså), and the class of 
renouncers (isi-pariså). Unless one assumes, with Bollée p. 138, that vaißyas and ßËdras are 
subsumed in the group of the householders, this enumeration gains interest in the light of 
the statement in the Assalåyana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikåya (MN II p. 149) that the 
system of four varˆas does not exist among the Yonas and Kambojas. [Note however that 
in the Mahåparinibbåna Sutta (DN II p. 141) the Buddha points out that wise khattiya 
(khattiya-paˆ∂itå), wise brahmins (bråhmaˆa-paˆ∂itå) and wise householders (gahapati-
paˆ∂itå) will look after his relics (sar¥ra-pËjaµ karissanti); if we add the monks, who should 
not look after the relics, we end up with a similar division of four types of people that 
characterizes the social order in Paesi's state.] 
 Among other noteworthy observations the following may be mentioned. P. 47 has 
an interesting remark about the use of mantras in Jainism, pointing out that standard studies 
— most notably Harvey Alper's Understanding Mantras (Delhi, 1991) — do not deal with 
Jaina mantras. P. 48 comments on the increasing loss in Jainism of interest for other schools 
of thought and observes: “the puvvas which may have recorded the tenets of other sects / 
schools objecting to Jainism will not have been ‘forgotten’ groundlessly, but the 
disappearance of the puvvas may be considered also symptomatic for the loss of interest in 
the greater tradition of Jainism as was shown early by the Digambaras and the fact that the 
version of important old texts such as Uttarajjhåyå handed down to us is based on one 
single exemplar. The laymen on their part seem to have largely replaced the religion of the 
monks and nuns by a ritual of their own, a development which the renouncers may have 
favoured by not participating in the temple cult.” Footnote 427 on p. 71 has: “The practice 
in Indian texts of mostly suppressing exact references and author names (eke, anye, uktaµ 
ca), so irritating for us, may be based on a rule of etiquette forbidding one to name older 
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authorities”.2 Pp. 109-110 contain a number of references from Jaina and Hindu sources 
pertaining to the significance of wearing wet clothes. On p. 128 we learn — with a 
reference to D. Darling, Zen Physics, New York 1996 — that “such experiments” 
(determining the difference of weight of people before and after death is no doubt meant) 
were sporadically even carried out over the past century (which one?), with negative 
results. A detailed discussion of a list of social skills (kalå) fills pp. 192-208. 
 
Paesi, we must conclude from the title of this book, was a materialist. Indeed, on p. 21 we 
find the following translation: “He was a materialist, very impious, ...” This and what 
follows translates a very long list of adjectives, so that it is not immediately clear which 
word is translated ‘materialist’. Judging by the order in which the adjectives appear, 
‘materialist’ translates a-dhammie (according to the glossary this corresponds to Påli a-
dhammika). Bollée apparently had some doubts about this translation, for on p. 25, in a note 
on A-dhammie, he states: “My translation (which one? JB) is a less-than-ideal solution, 
because Paesi accepts a hereafter ..., speaks of his late grandmother as a divine being ...” 
Moreover, on p. 80 he translates the same word as ‘wicked’. 
 The question whether Paesi accepts a hereafter deserves closer attention. According 
to Bollée, Paesi's acceptance of a hereafter finds expression in § 750 (pp. 98-101) and he 
speaks of his grandmother as a divine being in § 752 (pp. 105-107). This appears to be 
mistaken. Consider § 750, as translated by Bollée (p. 99-100): 
Thereupon prince Paesi spoke thus to Kesi (...): “If, Venerable Sir, this is the belief 
(...) of you Jain monks, that the soul and the body are different and not identical — 
now it is a fact that my grandfather just here in the town of Seyaviyå was a 
materialist (...) up to: nor in practice properly dealt with the burden of taxation of 
his own state. After acquiring a good deal of evil, very impure karman as you would 
say, he died after some time and reached the status of a being suffering in various 
hells. Of this grandfather I became the grandson, cherished, loved, liked, pleasing, 
charming, very firm (?), reliable, appreciated, much thought of, beloved, (precious 
like) a box of jewels, dear (as) his life, causing happiness in his heart, (an attractive 
person) as is rarely heard of, much less seen like the flower of the glomerata fig. 
 Now, if this my grandfather would come back to me and say: “Well, 
grandson, I was your grandfather. In this same town of Seyaviyå I was a materialist 
(etc. ...) up to: nor did I in practice properly deal with the burden of taxation. 
                                                
2 Olle Qvarnström (in Wagle and Qvarnström, Approaches to Jaina Studies, Toronto 1999, p. 187 n. 69) 
speaks, while referring to Bühler and Parpola, of an “‘pan-Indian etiquette’ forbidding direct cri t ici sm 
against doctrines propounded by older teachers” (my emphasis). 
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Consequently I accumulated a good deal of very impure unwholesome karma and 
got into hells. Therefore you, grandson, do not become a materialist (... as above) up 
to: nor deal in practice improperly with the burden of taxation; otherwise you will 
accumulate in just the same way a good deal of evil karma.” 
 If, therefore, my grandfather would come and speak thus to me, then I might 
believe, put my faith in, approve of (the teaching of the Jains) that the soul and the 
body are different, (but) as my grandfather has not come to me and spoken that way, 
my declared opinion is well established, Venerable Sir, that the soul and the body 
are identical.” 
The first of the three paragraphs of this passage puts words in the mouth of prince Paesi 
which suggest that he actually believed that his grandfather had suffered, or was suffering, 
in various hells. The second paragraph suggests the opposite, viz., that Paesi needs the 
direct testimony of his grandfather in order to believe this. The third paragraph confirms 
that — since no such testimony has been forthcoming — Paesi does not believe something. 
This something is here specified as the Jaina position according to which the soul and the 
body are different, but the context almost obliges us to identify this position with the belief 
that Paesi's grandfather was, or is, in hell. Paesi's own opinion — that the soul and the body 
are identical — cannot but imply that his grandfather is not in hell. In other words, this 
passage provides no reason to think that Paesi accepts a hereafter. The confusion is the 
result of the peculiar way in which Paesi presents his position in the passage thus translated: 
the first paragraph admits that according to Jaina doctrine his grandfather should be in hell, 
and is not intended to give his own point of view. Bollée apparently missed this (cp. p. 100: 
“It is remarkable that Paesi professes here, and further on, faith in a hereafter”). 
 There is more. The first paragraph contains the expression ‘as you would say’ 
(tubbhaµ vattavvayåe; cp. glossary under vattavvayå = vaktavyatå)). In Bollée's translation 
this expression merely qualifies the phrase very impure karman (“After acquiring a good 
deal of evil, very impure karman as you would say, ...”). It can however be construed with 
the whole sentence, which then becomes: “As you would say, after acquiring a good deal of 
evil, very impure karman, he died after some time and reached the status of a being 
suffering in various hells” (se ˆaµ tubbhaµ vattavvayåe su-bahuµ påva-kammaµ kali-
kalusaµ samajjiˆittå kåla-måse kålaµ kiccå annayaresu naraesu neraiyattåe uvavanne). 
This is also the way Leumann understood it.3 Read in this way, the paragraph contains no 
hint that Paesi professes faith in a hereafter. 
                                                
3 Leumann p. 511 (71): “Ich hatte einen gottlosen, bösen und sein Land nicht richtig verwaltenden 
Grossvater, der nach deiner Theorie (tubbhaµ vattavvayåe) für seine bösen Werke nach dem Tode in eine 
Hölle gelangt ist”. 
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 Exactly the same line of reasoning can be applied to § 752, where presumably Paesi 
speaks of his late grandmother as a divine being. Here too this position is in conflict with 
the immediately following paragraphs, and here too the expression ‘as you would say’ 
(here: tujjhaµ vattavvayåe) can be construed with the whole sentence: “As you would say, 
she accumulated a good deal of wholesome karma, died after some time and reached the 
status of a deity / was reborn as a deity in one of the heavens.”4 
 
So what can or should be said about Paesi's materialism? Bollée (p. 10) complains that our 
handbooks of Indian philosophy hardly take any notice of it, this, he adds, because it is no 
regular doctrine. He mentions in this connection the works by Erich Frauwallner, S. 
Dasgupta, and D. Chattopadhyaya; only Walter Ruben took notice of the Jaina sources, 
basing himself on Leumann. Bollée then continues (p. 10-11): “Yet materialism is not only 
as old as philosophy, it is as actual as ever for modern brain research, which may have 
started in 1882 with the examination of L. Gambetta's brain by Duval and became 
spectacular in the case of V. Lenin in 1925. It takes the soul, consciousness, the concept of 
‘I’ or spirit to be emergent attributes of brain functions. How mental processes can arise 
from these is a question discussed in many studies in the cognitive sciences. Paesi would 
have enjoyed reading, if he could have understood it, that ‘there is not the slightest bit of 
credible evidence to suggest that there is more to your self, to the feeling of being you, than 
a stunningly complex pattern of chemical and electrical activity among your neurons. No 
soul (...) no disembodied intelligence that can conveniently bail out when the brain finally 
crashes to its doom. If science is right, then you and I are just the transitory mental states of 
the brain’ or could have satisfied his curiosity without killing his criminal subjects if he 
could have attended Professor Dörner's laboratory experiments in Bamberg with his 
sensible and intelligent machine ‘James’ or read his books and those of many others in this 
field.” 
 Paesi might indeed have been delighted to read some of the books on brain research 
that flood the market in our time. Unfortunately there were no such books around in his 
time. Nor are we entitled, on the basis of the story of Paesi / Påyåsi, to conclude that this 
king did some kind of early brain research. Paesi's position is overwhelmingly negative. He 
                                                
4 So Leumann p. 512 (72): “Ich hatte nämlich eine recht fromme Grossmutter, die nach deiner Theorie für 
ihre guten Werke nach dem Tode in eine Götterwelt gelangt ist”. Note that Paesi is depicted, here and 
elsewhere, as being aware of Jaina doctrine. This is strange (for he has not yet been converted), but explains 
various other statements that are attributed to him. Statements like “åsava cannot actually very well mean 
‘inflow of karma’ here because Paesi does not know of the Jain theory of karma yet” (Bollée p. 148) seem to 
miss this point. 
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just does not believe those who maintain that there is a soul different from the body.5 All 
his experiments have as shared aim to show the inexistence of any such separate soul. 
Nowhere does Paesi show any interest in the question how a living being without separate 
soul could function, much less how a body (or a brain) can all by itself give rise to 
consciousness. The story of Paesi is therefore primarily of interest because it shows that 
there were people who felt sceptical with regard to the teachings of religion. It does not 
show that these people had a serious alternative to those traditional teachings. 
 
The book could have been more reader-friendly. Readers who wish to understand the 
numerous abbreviations used, for example, find on p. IX, under ‘Abbreviations’, the 
following remark: “These are the same as in Monier Williams for Sanskrit texts, as in the 
Critical Pali Dictionary for Pali texts and as in Bollée, B®hat-Kalpa-Niryukti for Ardha-
Mågadhi and Prakrit scriptures.” A number of supplementary abbreviations are added on 
the same page, while for the sigla of texts used one has to turn to pp. 12-14.  
 Apart from such minor shortcomings, both historians of thought and philologists 
will be happy to use this book, which will further facilitate access to Jaina canonical 
literature. 
                                                
5 This scepticism takes, of course, a different form in the Buddhist version. Cp. Leumann p. 471 (31): 
“[Påyåsi] hatte den verwerflichen Glauben, dass es kein Jenseits, keine Wiedergeburt und keine Vergeltung 
der guten und schlechten Werke gebe.” The fact that Påyåsi's experiments subsequently concentrate on the 
existence of the soul (Leumann p. 478 ff. (38 ff.); DN II. 333 f.; the Påli word is j¥va) merely confirms that the 
story of Paesi / Påyåsi has not originated in Buddhist circles. 
